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1, Introduction
This paper represents a further attempt to construct models to predict
the behavior of individuals who are faced with effort allocation decisions
among several areas which compete for his total effort o While we have chosen
to impute to these individuals certain kinds of maximizing intent the resulting
optimal behavior in fact resembles satisficing in some of these models.
In the models to be presented herej as well as in our earlier paper [ 24 ],
the models are constructed utilizing knowledge or theory of human behavior which
may be found in or inferred from the psychological literature where such know-
2
ledge or theory exists. Inasmuch as psychologists have concerned themselves
little with testing the way in which aspiration levels or goals affect task
performance where only one performance area is involved, and even less where
multiple tasks exist, much of the hypothesizing is based upon what "reasonable"
behavior would be in light of what evidence and theory is available.
Each of the models is constructed upon a set of assumptions about what
an individual wants to do--e.g. minimize the risk of unacceptable performance--
and proceeds to an optimal pattern of effort allocation for him should he be
in fact working to achieve his desire. The optimal behavior patterns so de-
duced may be used to formulate hypotheses for experimental test. If, for
example, in a supervisor-subordinate relationship, the supervisor presents a
set of goals to his subordinate, the latter may strive to achieve as many of
4his term was e o ined by H. A, Simon. For a thorough treatment, see his
[ 21 ]; also see Charnes and Cooper [ 5 ] for similar chance-constrained
formulations
.
^It should be pointed out that maximizing behavior assumptions are not
foreign to the psychological literature. See Lewin, Dembo, Festinger and
Sears [ 15 ], Davidson, Siegel and Suppes [9 ], Mostelkr and Nogee [ 18 ]
and Edwards [ 11 ]. More closely related to this paper, Radner [ 19 ] has
presented a linear programming formulation of the effects of two competing
activities on optimal resource allocation for profit maximization.

-2-
the goals as possible. Alternatively, he may strive to Increase his chance of
achieving all of them £r he may strive to achieve as many as possible but with
particular emphasis on certain goal areas he perceives as critical and In
which he Is willing to accept only a limited risk of non-attainment. Observa-
tion of the goal structure as well as questioning of the subordinate as to
his perception of it and observational and interview determination of the
effort allocation will serve, with the aid of the models, to provide insight
into the actual decision rules through which he responds to a set of goals.
It is not suggested that an individual's non- job-oriented personal goals
do not serve as a determinant of his behavior. These goals may be provided
for explicitly by arraying them alongside of the supervisor's goals. Alter-
natively, they may be provided for implicitly in terms of the limitation on
overall effort which the subordinate is willing to allocate among the perfor-
mance areas for which goals have been set by his supervisor. In addition,
the individual's personal goals are expected to affect the function of the
supervisor's goals he chooses to strive to attain. To utilize a concept in
aspiration level theory people whose personal goals reflect a pattern of
"hope of success" insight be Inclined toward a function of externally provided
goals in which he attempts to attain as many goals which he knows to be impor-
tant as possible. A person whose pattern was "fear of failure" might alter-
natively be expected to attempt to reduce his risk of turning in unacceptable
performance--! .e . attempt to make the probability of attainment of all of the
goals set for him as high as possible--even though in so doing he knowingly
allocates more effort to unimportant performance areas than they merit.
See, for example, Becker and Siegel [3 ], Becker and Parsons [ 2 ],
and Rotter [ 20 ].

It has been frequently suggested that goals should be set by a supervisor
only with the participation of the subordinate. Recent evidence obtained by
French, Kay and Meyer [ 12 ] indicates that the presence or absence of a spe-
cific goal in an area appears to affect performance improvement while signifi-
cant effects on performance improvement depending upon whether or not goals
were set participatively could not be shown. Evidence obtained by one of the
authors ( [ 22 ] and [ 23 ]) indicates that amount of public commitment;^ obtained
to a presented goal appears to affect performance, but that the magnitude of
the goal is also of importance. One is therefore led, on the basis of what
evidence is available, to investigate how the number of goals set and their
magnitudes (and what these magnitudes represent in terms of the amount of
effort required to assure a given probability of attainment) affect performance,
Should participation in the goal setting process be shown to affect performance
in certain situations, the effects can certainly be expressed in terms of
additional effort the individual will make available to the areas in which
goals have been set or to the relative weights an individual might attach to
goal attainment in areas in which goals are set participatively as opposed to
areas in which they are set unilaterally (by his supervisor) . In either case
the effects of participation could be incorporated without change in the
models of this paper. In fact, the models could be used as an aid to more
precise evaluation of the effects of participation on goal attainment.
ISee, for example, McGregor [ 17 ], Argyris [ 1 ].
^In the sense used by Deutsch and Gerard [10 ].
•^Evidence presented by Hoppe [ 13 ] from study of children indicates that
if explicit rewards are provided for goal attainment the goals set by the child-
ren are lowered. Recognizing difficulties in extrapolating these results to
adults in an organizational setting, a caveat is suggested that, in tests of
participation, measures of performance must be carefully chosen to guard against
a confounding of observed performance improvement with a (possible) lowering of
the goals with which performance is compared in the participative setting.
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In the current paper, we present first a model of expected performance
maximization where performance is assumed to be a weighted sum of performance
in several areas. The performance in each area is assumed to be a stochastic
function of the effort allocated to the area and a constraint is imposed on
total effort. We then proceed to show that an equivalent problem can be con-
structed with explicit goals in each of the areas and rewards for attainment
of them. Thus, if a supervisor would wish to have a subordinate maximize
expected performance but explicit goals are more meaningful to the subordinate,
the transition from one criterion to the other is readily obtained.
Having established this equivalence, we investigate the situation in the
case of an individual who wishes either to maximize expected performance or
to maximize his expected reward through goal attainment, but subject to a set
of limitations on the risk he is willing to take on the non-attainment of some
minimum acceptable level in certain (or all) of the performance areas. We
show that this problem can be readily transformed into the expected perfor-
mance or expected reward maximization where the individual goal areas are not
so constrained. The transformation involved is equivalent to placing a lower
bound on the amount of effort allocated to each of the constrained performance
areas and optimizing over the set of pseudovariables which represent the value
of the variable decreased by their lower bounds. This process is analogous to
that used in dealing with lower bounds in the bounded variables problem of
linear programming.
Finally, we present a model in which the Individual wishes to maximize
the probability of the joint occurrence of goal attainment in all of the
performance areas. This problem is analogous to that of a manufacturer who,
^See Charnes and Lemke [ 7 ] and Charnes and Cooper [ 4 ]
,

producing a product on special order or contract, wishes to inaximlze the
probability of meeting all of the specifications the customer lays down for
acceptance of the item. Although beyond the scope of this paper, this model
is directly relevant to the question of producer's risk in quality control
and may be understood as a form of risk aversion if interpreted in terms of
economic theory.
In each of the models constructed, a computational algorithm is provided
for obtaining the optimal solution. Since each of the models starts from a
different assumption as to the motivation of behavior, the observed performances
and effort allocations can be compared with the computed predictions of the
models (and others) in order to assess the prediction value of the competing
behavioral assumptions.
^For a discussion of the kinds of organizational goals which are reason-
able to consider and a justification of investigation of models of maximizing
behavior with respect to various goals, see Marschak [ 16 ]
.
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2. Performance as a Stocha»ttc Funption of Effort
In order that we may construct a framework within which to study the
effects on effort allocation of differing performance criteria, it is neces-
sary to make some assumptions about the response of performance in each of the
performance areas to the amount of effort applied. It is desired that this
response be stochastic--i.e. that increase in effort will result in greater
expected performance and greater probability of perfoinnance at or above a
particular level—rather than a deterministic response that can be predicted
with certainty. Further, in the interest of realism, it is desirable that no
finite amount of effort can assure performance at a given level (above some
minimal level that can be achieved without effort expenditure). Finally, it
is desired that the function portray diminishing returns to additional effort
as effort is increased.
A distribution which possesses all of the desirable attributes «id wil^ be
used here is a modification of that presented by Chames and Cooper in [ ].
Assume that the probability that performance in the j performance area,
3., is greater than or equal to some amount a, . may be expressed as a function
of the form:
(la)
^^^j^ij^ " ''ij^^ ^""j^^ ^
lifhere
i "" 1 , . • • ,<"
j = 1, . . . ,n
k.
.
> k(]^ ==^ i <i
and
(lb) P (s, > a .) = 1
where
a^ > a ^ for i >
ij oj

and where p is the amount of effort allocated to the j performance variable,
a. > Ca given constant, and 0<k..<l. It is seen that:
1
'
- ij
(2) k, . 5 lim P(s. > a..)
th
that is, k is the limiting probability of attainment of the i performance
level as effort is increased without bound. It is assumed that k. . is a
function of past performance and technology and hence independent of any deci-
sion in the current period. Also, as p.—>0, the probability of attaining any
level above some minimum level a
,
(which can be attained with no managerial
oj
effort allocated to the j variable) approaches zero. The positive constant
a may be interpreted as the relative "sensitivity" of the j variable to
increased effort, i.e., the rate at which the limiting probability is approached
as p is increased.
Fojruse in a short-run model, this formulation would appear inherently
sound. It Includes both a technological constraint on possible performance
independent of the manager's activity and a variable portion over which he does
have control. Product interdependence can be introduced to a limited extent
through a constraint on overall managerial effort, namely
(3) ^ P4 < P
j
The distribution function defined above may be used in the construction
of models of many types of goal-oriented managerial behavior, one of which
we have presented in [ 24 ] . In order that it may be utilized in the construc-
tion of models dealing with the expected values of performance in a particular
area we note from (la) and (lb) that:
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(4) P (s . = a^j) = P (s . > a^j) - P (s^ > a^^^^^)
= (k., - k.^, .) (1 - e'^jPj) where i > 1
and
(5) P (s. = d ) = 1 - k, .(1 - e"^j^j) where i =
A Profit Maximization Model
A possible objective for a decision oo effort allocation might be profit
maximization in the classical sense, where it may be assumed that each unit
of performance has a price and a variable cost, their difference representing
the contribution of one unit of performance to fixed cost and profit. Let
us assume that management wishes to maximize expected profit, represented by
a sum of the expected performances in n areas weighted by the relative con-
tributions of a unit of performance in each of the areas. I.e., assume that
management wishes to:
n
Max E (jt) = E p.E (s
.)
j=l ' '
n
(6) subject to Z p. < p
j=i J
pj>'
Returning to Equations (4) and (5) we obtain for the expected values of
performance in the j area:
OS
-<^.P.^ „ 4. ri _ 1, /-I _ ^-^iP, a(7) E (sj) -Z^ (k^. - k^^^_.) (1 - , fi)
.^j + tl - k^j (1 - . fi)] .^^
Let us define S . as the limit of the expected value of performance in the j
area as p. —^ oo, or:
J ^
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(8) s . = S (k^, - k... .) a_+(l - k )a
,
Then (7) becomes
-«J^J
(9) E(s.) = s - e [s. - a .]
J J J OJ
and
-a. p.
n . n I j^j
(10) E(«) = r p. E(s.) = Z U, T. - p. e [T. - a ]
j=l J J j=l y J J J J OJ
Performing, a further substitution,
(11)
,,
=p.[S-. .a„^l
n
And noting that Z P . s* is independent of the effort allocation
j=l J J
process, we can express management's profit maximization problem as:
-Ct p.
n J^J
Min * Z Ti.e
j=l ^
(12) subject to E p. = p
J
p. >
J
-
-0!.P.
noting that the strict monotonicity properties of the e ' ^ insure that the
optimal allocation will allocate all of the available effort, p.
The profit minimization problem under the specified conditions has thus
been reduced to the same convex programming problem we have presented in [ ]
.
The solution, adapted from an earlier solution presented by Charnes and Cooper
[ 6 ], follows from the Kuhn -Tucker theorem whose [ 14 J Cjjnditionr oecome:
-a.p,
(13) a^* J Jti^ = 4. j e J
aj Tij
= f - t . j ^ J , t . >
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where J = ]j| p . >
(14)
Now let
so that (13) becomes;
T^-'^jV
7. = oc.p. = l(n6 jeJ
J J J
7. < in^
J =
J M
Eliminating the algebra, which has been presented in the earlier paper, it
obtains that:
(15) in* - -^
L
a
J
7^
jeJ j
P
so that conditions for the optimal higher management choice of those areas to
which effort should be allocated--i.e. , necessary and sufficient conditions
for the selection of indices r
€
J --become:
(16)
A
min 7 > 1
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4. Reward Maximization
This model has been the subject of our previous explorations [ 24] but
will be sketched here for completeness. Utilizing the same performance dis-
tribution function described by equations (4) and (5) , we again assume that
attainment of a particular level of performance is a function of the effort
allocated to the area. However, we assume that the reward associated with
attainment is a function of the number of areas in which a particular
"critical" level of performance is achieved, weighted by some set of relative
values which could be assigned to the various areas.
This type of reward function can be related to the psychologist's con-
ception of aspiration level where the latter is defined as that level of
performance at or above which an individual perceives "success" and below
which he perceives "failure." Thus, a student enrolled in sevecal courses
might consider the grade of B to represent success in mathematics but a grade
of A success in English and C success in thermodynamics. However, the
relative value to him of success in each of these areas might be determined
by the presumed importance of each to his major field, mechanical engineering,
which would be in the order; thermodynamics, mathematics, English. If
numerical values could be determined for these relative importance parameters,
as well as the probability parameters, our function could be constructed.
The student's problem would be to allocate his effort in such a way as to
maximize his expected success over the various subject areas in which he can
achieve it
.
We will, however, construct our model utilizing the terminology of the
budgeting process as practiced in many industrial organizations. Here, for
each supervisor above a certain level in the organization, a series of budgets
(or standards) are devised which serve as "acceptable" levels of performance
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in certain areas. For example, there might be budgets for overhead cost,
scrap, overtime cost and production. There is, presumably, a difference in
importance attaching to the attainment of each one of these budgets or goals
and hence in the amount of reward or punishment (explicit or otherwise) a
supervisor can expect depending upon which goals he attains or does not attain.
Clearly if a subordinate is to be judged against a standard, some result
must be expected from the judgment. That these rewards and punishments are
not usually meted out period by period is not a serious criticism of this
approach inasmuch as these cumulative effects should be in some sense signifi-
cant (although perhaps subject to a form of revenue discounting, later attain-
ments being seen as more significant than early ones) . We shall adhere to
the usual practice of judgment--i .e
.
, that black (or positive) variances are
"good," red (or negative) variances "bad" --where the degree of redness and
blackness is not considered formally. It is assumed that a reward r is
administered for attainment, a punishment p. for non-attainment, of the j
product budget. A subordinate's expected reward may be expressed, then, ass
n , n
(18) R = R° + Z r. E(z.) - Z p, E(zT)
^ "^ j=l J J j=l ^ J
where z. (resp. zT) is 1 (resp. 0) if s >b and (resp. 1) otherwise,
J J Jt - Jt
s. and b. are, respectively, the actual performance and budgeted performance
J t J t
for the j area in the t period, R is the subordinate's expected reward
in the t period and r and p the amounts which are added to or subtracted
J j
from the base reward R in the event of attainment or non-attainment, respec-
tively, of budgeted performance in the j area to obtain the reward for the
period. A more thorough discussion of this function may be found in [ 24 ]
.
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t'\\
If we now look only at the t period, we may drop the t subscript.
We then assume that management can select for b one of the levels of attain-
ment a . for which a probability of attainment has been defined in equations
(la) and (lb), say a .. The probability of budget attainment may then be
expressed as
(19)
1 i-
Thus b = is seen to be the index of a budget attainable with or without effort
J
allocation. All other budgets are attainable with some probability less than
1, depending upon the amount of effort allocated to their attainment.
Returning to equation (18) we note that:
(20a) E(z'!") = (1) P(s > aj^ j) + (O)P(s^ < a^^ ^)
and
(20b) E(zr) = (0) P(s. > a^^ ) + (l)P(s. < a^^ j)
so that eliminating that subscript, the expected one-period reward function
becomes I
n n
(21) E(R) = R + Z r .P(s . > a^ .) - Z p. P(s < a. ,) .
J=l ^ > J J = l -^ J
'-Because we are using a discrete distribution, a , may be considered to
represent, in fact, a range about the stated j budget which is
considered to be just attaining the budget. The usual application of the
"principle of exceptions" in fact allows such a tange (or threshold)^ be fore
an "exception" is recognized.
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We shall number Che performaace areas such that:
where b.>0, j=l,...,m
(22)
and where b.=0, j=m+l,...,n
Clearly those products for which b. = simply contribute to the fixed reward
and the rational manager will not allocate effort to them provided there is at
least one product for which b. > 0, which shall be assumed also. Eliminating
fixed rewards, the manager, if he acts rationally, will attempt to:
m -0!.p.
Minimize C = Z (r. + p.) k, , e ^ ^
(23)
m
subject to Z p, = p
j=l J
Thus he attempts to obtain the maximum reward for the effort he expends
.
For simplicity, let:
(24) h. = (r. + p ) kj^
^
j = l,,..,m.
Then the problem can be stated:
Minimize C = S h. e ^ ^
m
""^iPi
J
(25)
j = l
m
subject to Z p. = p
j = l J
Pj >o
Otherwise, at least in the short run, the manager cannot improve his
reward by expending effort, so the allocation problem would be trivial.
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It will, of course, be inmedlately obvious that this problem is of the
same form as the profit maximization problem. Its solution is identical in
.-)?»form but to provide a convenient distinction, we have substituted f. =Kn (a.h.)
for 7 , if for \|f and added primes on the p* and J . The necessary and
j s s
sufficient condition for the selection of indices re J' becomes:
(26) min
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Thls condition is not necessary, however. In order that the solution to (25)
will provide the same effort allocation as the solution to (6) we require the
weaker condition which we shall state and prove as a theorem.
*< *
Theorem ; Necessary and sufficient conditions for p = p . r€ J are choice of
b , r . and p . such that
J J J
(i)
(ii)
b. >
J
for all jeJ
A A ^
fy = Tj. + g , reJ
where g is an arbitrary constant
(iii)
and
(iv)
f < E
jeJ
7i
a.
min f >
( 2
OC.
JeJ a.
A
+ g
Proof
Condition (i) is clearly sufficient for J to be included in the set of
the first m j's in the cut effected by (22). For necessity, suppose that for
some k€ J, b = 0. Then p^ =0; but by definition of J, Pi. > ^ so that
* *'
p f p , a contradiction.
For brevity, the terminology developed in earlier sections of the paper
will be introduced without further (formal) definition.
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Condition (il) implies
1
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Hence f and y differ by the same constant, say g, for all r. For the
necessity of condition (iii) we introduce without proof the following lemma:
Lemma
1If
m+1 >
m
A
m f 1
Z - p
J = l J
then
A
f .. >
m+1 m+1
m+1 fi
J = l J
Now then, suppose ^ f , t^ J such that
A
^t> (^ ^>j€J j ^
+ 8
By condition (ii) and the lemma,
A r
( 2 rr-)ajeJ t i-
A
ft
a
implying te J
'
, or J' ^ J, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose, for some q€ J
,
A
f
q
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Constraints on Risk in Critical Areas
It is frequently of interest to maximize the weighted sum of expected
values (or its equivalent problem of maximization for reward attainment)
subject to constraints on minimum acceptable performance in a subset of
"critical"perfonnance areas . We may thus wish to solve the problem:
Max E (n) = E ( S p. s.)
j = l ^ ^
subject to P(s. > a .) > h ., j = l,...,m
J - jJ - J
(29)
2 p = p
j=l J
p >
, j = 1, ...,n
where the performance areas are numbered so that the first m j's are
constrained. The constraints may be interpreted as a statement
of the maximum risk (1 - t.) that will be accepted for performance
below the acceptable level, a .. The problem may be restated with
the functional and all constraints in terms of the p. as:
J
n -cc.p.
Min. Z Tj. e J -
subject to
(30) ^d.j ^'
-""^'''^
> V ' =^'---'-
J
n
2^ p. = P
j=l J
p. > , j = 1, . . .,n
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We define, for the constrained performance areas, the minimum level of
effort which will just attain the required performance in that area, p ,
by the equations:
-a. P. I
(31) k, . (1 - e J J) = ^,, j = l,...,mdjj J
The minimum values of p. in the other areas are 0, so that, preserving
consistency, we may define
(32) P. = , j = m + l,...,n
By means of the following transformations,
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5- Maximization of the Probability of Joint Goal Attainment
In dealing with certain kinds of effort allocation problems, one may
be interested not in maximizing expected performance or expected reward,
but in the probability of the joint occurrence of goal attainment or acceptable
performance over the set of performance areas . This is equivalent to the
minimization of the risk of not achieving acceptable performance where the
latter is defined as performance up to an acceptable level in all areas. If
we again assume independent probabilities of performance attainment (subject
to the functional dependence Imposed by a constraint on overall effort)
,
we may express the functional as;
m -Q P -^ .(
(35) a ="0 P(s. > a. .) = TfK 4 (1 - e J J) = (fTk. ,) TT (1 - e ^
._i j-D.j .b.j .b.j.
J-1 J J J J J J
For convenience, we liminate the constant term and transform the
functional by
(36) e = An (^=r^ )
so that the problem may be stated as:
Mln. f = - E jfn (1 - e ^ J)
m
(37) subject to p - Z p. > 0.
j=l ^
"

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions become:
-?2-
1
(38) - — = \x where p-I =0, ii>0, j = l,...,m
1 - . J"J i"
which yield
-a. p. -a.p
(39) ^.p. = ^ i-f^^)
P ~ ^Pz - ^
J
i.e. ^
On examining the original statement of the functional, Q., it may be
remarked that unless the minimum risk that is sought is small, the criterion
would probably be meaningless and another adopted. The area of interest for
this problem, then, is one for which the maximum value of Q is close to
-a.p.
probability 1, indicating that each of the (e -* -") will be small--certainly
less than, say, 0,1 and in all likelihood, much smaller. Thus the ratio
—'^
— is small or:
(40) ii < <0C,
providing a possibility of approximation of ^i. For an approximation, we note
that
ii4a. a.
(41) P = ^^ ^" (-T^) -^ ^ -^ ^" ^7^> •
^c<ote that for |i = 0, no solution obtains for finite p. so that the
condition on Ep. must be satisfied as an equality.
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and let '^ be defined by
(42) p = E -^ X n (-=-)
J J
^
areSince \x is determined by p = Z —— In (1+—), smaller values of —
j j ^
^
a.
involved than in p = Z — -"^ n ( ) , hence \x must be larger than \i.
a. n
Thus
'JT is a lower bound for \x. An explicit solution is easily obtainable
for ji, for
(43) p- L-^ Ina - in iix) Z^
j j j j
^5~ j j
H = e
We note further that:
(44) p = ,^i„(^) < ,^ /„(^e M
since u + a. < a e -' .
J - J
We next rewrite the preceding inequality on p as
(45) [p - L-— (na.] > irniZ^ -^s^
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Divlding through by Z — , the left side becomes the expression for ifn "ji. Thus
(46) in ;r > jfn n - ^ ^
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Solving
(52) ^ (1 -P^) = M
we obtain
(53) H - 2P
which yields the implicit constraint \i < l/4p .
Solving
(54) ii e"^^ = ^,
we obtain
d - >/ 1 - pn )
, V <~' - *.r 2 A.
(55) H<M<ji = kie
The error of the estimate, n, is thus seen to be bounded via
(56) 1 < ^ < e ^ 2
Recalling the functional in the original problem:
(57)
Let
ft = Tf p ^s . > a, .] = n k, , (1 - e J J)
-a.p
"•wit- -TTCl- ^J).
Since by (49) either root satisfies ^ > |i, the smaller as the closer
approximation to ^ is preferred.
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wherein we suppose optimal values for the p.
Thus
Then
(60)
Now
-«.P. 0=i
(59) 1 - e " " <lJ J ^ 1 - -U- J
H-KX^ ^-HX^
a
J J J ^ a J J J J
(61) i-= TT (1+^) > l + ^^2:i- .
j J J J
Thus
(62) 7- > w.
1 + „ L^ -
J J
Hence
(63)
^
—1 >
~
—
r >w>i-tiZ^>i-^^2:^
j j j j
We have thus established lower and upper bounds on the estimate of \i (and hence
estimated p .) and w, which provides limits on the estimated probability of
acceptable performance.
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Concluslon
The models which have been presented naturally suffer from difficulties
of oversimplification and dependence upon a single assumed type of density
function. By proceeding in this fashion, however, we gain the advantages of
the existence of computational algorithms which may be used to facilitate
hypothesis testing. In those cases in which a fairly simple algorithm exists --
such as the sequential choice of areas for effort allocation as provided for
in some of the models--it may be assumed that the subordinate can arrive at
optimal solutions to the object he seeks without special technical training.
Some of the optimal allocation rules, however, are quite complex. It is
therefore likely that although the subordinate may be seeking such an objec-
tive he may not be capable of allocating his effort in an optimal way. This
suggests, of course, additional areas for experimental study, as, e.g., in
the misdirection of effort relative to perceived or held goals due to technical
inadequacy to infer optimal effort allocations. In such cases it is possible
that the role of the supervisor can be helpful in a suggestive or directive
manner; possibly to the extent of translating the subordinated goals into
another set of goals with which he is adequately prepared to deal. Such
work, of course, would tie in with the experimental work of Churchill and
Cooper [ 8 ] of the effect of an auditor and his actions on audited
personnel
.
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